A general model for the evolution of altruism is formulated. Central to the model is a pair of local fitness functions, which prescribe the fitness of the altruist and selfish phenotypes as functions of the composition of local groups into which prereproductives are subdivided. When the local groups are sibships or other kin groups, the model is one for kin selection. Functions for cost and benefit of altruism are derived from the fitness functions. Conditions for evolution of altruism are then determined in terms of cost and benefit. It is shown that the Hamilton rule has quantitative validity only in the special case of linear fitness functions. Sufficient conditions are found for qualitative validity of the Hamilton rule. Qualitative violation of the rule is also possible.
The evolutionary basis of hierarchial status, cooperative foraging strategies, helping in brood rearing, signaling in preypredator conflicts, and recognition and communication systems are discussed by some writers in terms of adaptive and physiological correlates, where the role of kin selection is considered central. Altruism might be involved in social interactions to the extent that they appear to increase the reproductive success of some recipient individuals and decrease the fitness of other conspecific members of the group, the donors. Theoretical models of the population genetics of altruism and kin selection are many and varied (refs. 1-15; see ref. 16 for a recent review and further references).
Hamilton (1) proposed the following rule as a basis for the evolution of a gene (or set of genes) promoting altruistic behavior:
b/c > 1/r, [1] where c is the cost to a donor of altruistic behavior, b is the benefit to a recipient per donor, and r is the appropriate coefficient of kinship among donors and recipients. Recall the traditional values of r: for diploid sibs, r = 1/2; for haplodiploid sisters, r = 3/4; and for half-sibs, r = 1/4.
The evolutionary event of altruism can be realized at several levels. The usual criterion is that the altruistic allele be protected (i.e., cannot go extinct when in low frequency). This will be referred to as the property of initial increase, I . A more compelling form of gene evolution entails the fixation event, F, signifying a total takeover by the allele in question once present in high frequency.
We will speak of the quantitative validity of the Hamilton rule with respect to the property of initial increase provided the following holds. There exists a measure of cost and benefit that may depend on the nature of gene expression and degree of penetrance but is independent of the kin-group structure such that the fulfillment of Eq. 1 signifies that a newly introduced altruistic gene will increase in frequency.
With respect to the property of initial increase, we interpret the qualitative validity of the Hamilton rule to reflect the robust property that if an altruist gene is protected for a population regime providing altruistic benefits to individuals in a group having an average kinship relationship r, then the altruist gene would be protected for a corresponding population regime with closer group kinship relationship r' > r.
The concepts of quantitative and qualitative validity with reference to the fixation event are defined analogously, mutatis mutandis.
In this paper we describe a flexible "fitness function" formulation relevant to the population genetics of altruism (cf. refs. 5, 6, and 12) . The components of the model involve: (i) the delineation of the basic group structure specifying individual relationships; (ii) the description of local fitness functions depending on the group composition; (iii) the determination of population average fitness functions for the different phenotypes; and (iv) a pair of general benefit and cost functions, which depend on the group composition. The latter functions are derived and do not enter as primitive quantities.
Individual Fitness in Groups with Altruistic Interactions
Consider an infinite population reproducing in discrete generations whose members belong to either of two phenotypic classes: those who regularly perform some altruistic activity, the altruist A, and those who do not, the selfish individuals S. We assume that this polymorphism is controlled by an array of genotypes G1,G2,.. .,Gk underlying the phenotype expression. The genotype-phenotype associations allow for partial penetrance such that P1,P2,kPk denote the penetrance probabilities that the genotypes G1,...,Gk, respectively, result in an altruist (A phenotype) and, in the alternative event, a nonaltruist (S phenotype).
We assume that the ethology of the species is such that newborn individuals of generation t + 1 form "appropriate" groups of finite size N. The groups are considered to be distinct from each other and persist through the prereproductive phase. (it) Half Sibships. The members of each group are halfsibs-i.e., they have a common mother but distinct fathers. This can be regarded as a limiting case of multiple inseminations as discussed (5, 12) . Under random mating, given the maternal genotype and the paternal gametic pool, the distribution of Z is multinomial.
Other methods of group formation may include: (i) mixed sib/random groups where, with each parental pair, each member of the group is either a random offspring of the pair or a newborn chosen at random from the population at large; (ii) groups determined by degrees of assortment based on genotype and/or phenotype; and (iii) groups based on population structure criteria.
For a variety of group formation rules, the distribution of Z = (Z1,...,Zk), the various genotype numbers in a typical group, under proper conditioning, is multinomial with probability parameters that either are constants or depend on the parental genotypic frequencies. More formally, we have
where P(X) is a probability distribution for X = (X1,...,Xk) and the components of A = (X1,...,XAJ indicate the expected genotypic frequencies in a given group. PROPOSITION 1. Under conditionally multinomial sampling, the number ofA phenotypes in a group, X = X1 + + Xk, follows conditional on X a binomial distribution of N trials with probability 6-P1X + P2X2 + -.-+ PkXk.
Obviously, 6 is the expectedfraction ofaltruists in a group with sampling-segregation vector parameter X. The population at large can be viewed as stratified with respect to the parameter 6. Over the subpopulation of groups '% with expectedfraction of altruists 6, a sampled group is composed ofX altruists and N -X nonaltruists following the distribu-
Averaging with respect to all groups of % characterized by an expected number NO of altruists, we find that the ex- The functions of 4A(O) and 4s(O) will be referred to as the expected fitness functions for an A and S phenotype, respectively, corresponding to a group that has an expected fraction 6 of altruists.
Derivation of Cost and Benefit of Altruism as Functions of Group Composition
Since Hamilton's rule (Eq. 1) is formulated in terms of cost and benefit of altruism, most theoretical work on kin selection is founded on specific models involving cost and benefit as primitive notions (usually constant parameters). Our general method of fitness assignments does not deal directly with cost and benefit, so that a direct comparison of its results with Hamilton's prognosis would seem impossible. On the other hand, from an operational point of view, cost and benefit can only be defined as changes of fitness.
Consider a group with x altruists and N -x selfish individuals, and, among these, a particular A individual, and call it I. If I could change its phenotype into S, it would have fitnessfs(x -1), but it actually has fitnessfA(x); thus, the cost to I of being an altruist is cost(I) = fs(x -1) -fA(x). 
Expected Cost and Benefit Functions
The cost and benefit functions described in Definitions 1 and 2 refer to the local group. For groups with expected proportion of A phenotypes equal to 6, we have the expected cost to a typical altruist belonging to such groups as -y (6) It is straightforward to derive the identities Y(6) = 4S (6) OA(), /8(6) = 040 (6) It follows that the expected fitness functions {4s(6),4A(6)} and the expected cost and benefit functions {y(O),/3(6)} equivalently delimit the selective structure of these models.
*It is essential to emphasize that we cannot extract from the expected cost and benefit functions in general a natural (intrinsic) cost-benefit set of marginal constant parameters. There are no such things.
A class of examples considers the one-function models of the form 4s(6) = 1 + bh(6), OA(6) = 1 + (1 -a)bh(6) -c [2] where a is a parameter 0 s a < 1 and 0 < c s 1. For convenience we factored out the parameter b > 0 to fix the normalization h'(O) = 1. In order for Eq. 2 to generate a meaningful set of benefit-cost functions, we require h(6) to be monotope, increasing (h'(0) 0). Obviously, h(6) apart from translation and/or scale constants represents the fitness functions OA(O) and fs (6) .
The altruism fitness model of Eq. 2 can be given the following interpretation: (i) all S individuals receive help from A individuals; (ii) each A individual suffers an additive constant fitness loss, c; (iii) a fraction a of A individuals are not recipients of altruistic benefits; (iv) all recipients of altruism gain an additive fitness increment bh (6) , where is the expected fraction of altruists in the relevant group.
The above model (Eq. 2) generalizes models I and II of Charlesworth (10) , where h(6) = 6/(1 -6), a = 1, and h(O) = 6, a = c, respectively. The choice h(6) = 6, a = 0 produces the Cavalli-Sforza-Feldman additive model (9) . The derived benefit and cost functions for the model of Eq. 2 are, respectively, 'y(6) = c + abh (6) and /3(6) = b(1 -a6)h'(0).
Conditions for Initial Increase and Fixation of a Gene for Altruism
It is convenient to introduce the generalized average cost and benefit functions for the interval (1,,2), 0 f1 < f2 1, namely, Q61, 2) = f 1 I2 y(6)dO, B(41,e2) = /2 P(6)d6. Table 1 records the exact conditions ensuring initial increase I and fixation F when the (A,S) polymorphism is controlled by a single autosomal locus with two alleles, Ao and A1. The altruist allele A1 is either fully dominant (D) or recessive (R) and has penetrance p (0 < p s 1), so that the probabilities of expressing altruism for the three genotypes AoAo, AoA1, and A1Aj are, respectively, 0, p, and p in the dominant case and 0, 0, and p in the recessive case. The conditions of Table 1 can be derived from those published in ref. 12 , which are in terms of a pair of functions A(w) and S(w) prescribing the expected fitness of potential altruist and selfish genotypes, respectively, in a group where the expected proportion of potential altruist genotypes is w. Because the functions OA and Os give the fitness of the altruist and selfish phenotypes, the relation between the two pairs of fitness functions, for any fixed degree p of penetrance, is A(w) = poA(pw) + (1 -p)4s(pw), S(w) = 4s(pw) because, when the expected proportion of genotypes which can express altruism is w, the expected proportion of altruistic phenotypes is = pw.
Inspection of Table 1 reveals that the conditions of initial increase and fixation all have the form displayed in Eq. 3 below (r is the relevant coefficient of kinship). RESULT 1. Defining X as below, the conditions for evolution of altruism become X'(i,e,p) = '(iep) >1 and XF(iep) > 1, 10 (i, e, (i)e'p) [3] where i = 0, 1, or 2 indexes the kin-group structure of the model (0 = haplodiploid sister sibs, 1 = diploid sibs, and 2 = half-sibs), the two-valued variable e = R or D specifies recessive or dominant gene expression, and p is the penetrance probability of an altruist genotype. I and F indicate that evolution of altruism is assessed by the initial increase and fixation event, respectively. (Detailed proofs of all results in this paper and further extensions and interpretations Analogous to Eq. 4 , there exist versions of the qualitative validity for I and dominant gene expression and the corresponding relations underlying the fixation F criterion for evolution of altruism.
With respect to quantitative validity of the Hamilton rule, we state the following definition.
Definition 4: For a given criterion of evolution of altruism (say I or F) and a given gene expression (D or R), we say that the quantitative validity of the Hamilton rule holds provided the general benefit to cost ratio functions X(p) of Eq. 3 are independent of the kin groups.
There are several natural explicit versions reflecting quantitative validity. The quantitative validity of the Hamilton rule for the criterion of initial increase I and a recessive gene expression R requires the equations X'(0,Rp) = X'(1,R,p) = X'(2,R,p) for all p. [5] In the presence of Eq. 5, we can unambiguously refer to any of the terms J'(',R,p) as the benefit-cost ratio function. This is not a ratio of constants but depends on p and the specifications I and R.
There are corresponding versions of quantitative validity for the evolutionary criterion I and dominant gene expression and for F coupled to either recessive or dominant gene expression.
It is clear, under the conditions of the quantitative validity of the Hamilton rule, that altruism will evolve more easily for a closer kin-group structure. Indeed, suppose the identities of Eq. 5 hold for the given gene expression, and the condition ' (1,R,p) (ii) For the initial increase recessive gene case (IR) it is sufficient that h(x) be convex increasing in order that the qualitative validity of the Hamilton rule holds. (iii) In assessing the circumstances for the qualitative validity of the Hamilton rule a qualitative dictum emerges revolving on the following contrasting themes: "few altruists are better than many" [I] versus "many altruists are better than few."
[II]
The Hamilton rule (Eq. 1) and the principle of "Maximization of Inclusive Fitness" have been proposed as an intrinsic construct for the evolution of altruism by kin selection. It is contended that the closer coefficient of kinship for haplodiploid sisters compared to diploid siblings allows more opportunities for the fulfillment of the condition b/c > 1hr and, concordantly, genes for altruism are more easily established. The prototype case is the social hymenoptera insects with sterile castes. The simplicity of the Hamilton rule is appealing. However, it is undeniable that behavioral traits by their very nature are intrinsically complex. They undoubtedly involve multifactorial inheritance coupled to a myriad of gene-environment interactions and learning and cultural transmission factors. Even in the context of one-locus models, the prediction of Eq. 1 is defiantly simple. Notice that the quantities b, c, -and r appear to be independent of the degree or form of gene expression (e.g., level of dominance and penetrance), genotype-phenotype determinations, mating pattern, the nature and distribution of recipients and donors within and between "groups," group size, sex ratio, and other population-structure covariates.
We highlight the salient conclusions and some interpretations of our results:
(i) For a given kin-group structure, the conditions implying I and F all have the form of Eq. 3 (Result 1), where l( is a generalized benefit-to-cost ratio, the numerator being an appropriate average of the benefit function and the denominator an appropriate average of the cost function. The explicit averages depend on the criterion for assessing evolution of altruism, on the nature of gene expression, and on the kingroup structure. If further factors are incorporated into the model (e.g., more population-and group-structure parameters, preferential mating pattern, multiple phenotypic gradations, genetic modifiers) we would expect X to reflect these factors.
(ii) The concept of quantitative validity of the Hamilton rule requires the existence of a generalized benefit-to-cost ratio function that is independent of the kin-group structure. Result 3 shows that this is only realized in the special case of constant benefit and cost functions equivalent to parallel linThe qualitative validity of the Hamilton rule for the criterion of initial increase tends to apply in the circumstance of theme II. This, in essence, occurs in the case of decreasing cost function (i.e., cost per altruist diminishes), whereas a larger fitness benefit accrues to the recipients as the fraction of altruists in the group increases. The same conclusion obtains when ,8(0)/y(6), the "efficiency" of doing altruism, increases with 6.
In the purview of the criterion of fixation, the qualitative validity of the Hamilton rule conforms roughly to the dictum of theme I such that few altruists, rather than many, contribute more effectively to the fitness endowments of both A and S individuals. This applies to the case where y(6) increases and /3(6) decreases or ,8(0)/y(0) decreases.
